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IMPROVING TACTICAL PSYOP VIDEO DISSEMINATION IN

MEDIA-AUSTERE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS


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# ABSTRACT

U.S. video psychological operations (PSYOP) are difficult in austere operating environments lacking a mature television infrastructure.  The need for video PSYOP in such environments is great, due to low literacy rates, which narrow the reach of traditional print products. Video PSYOP has generally required an extant television network and viewing audience.  In operating environments where a network and viewing audience are not developed, tactical dissemination means must fill the gap.

Recent operations demonstrate the requirement for video PSYOP in media-austere environments where the target audience lacks access to television, due to poverty, or lack of supporting infrastructure.  Media-austere operating environments lack the indigenous TV programming necessary to attract the target audience.  Accordingly, Video PSYOP also requires a supporting base of culturally appropriate video programming.

PSYOP modernization efforts must obtain access to such supplemental programming while developing the technical means for tactical video dissemination.  In a media-austere operating environment, tailor-made video products must be created and delivered on-site, in remote villages, military bases, and cities, to small audiences using tactical dissemination systems operated by PSYOP soldiers.

Successful video PSYOP in media austere operating environments require modern, versatile tactical video dissemination means that can withstand field conditions and complement tactical operations.

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**Chapter 1**

**Introduction**

Recent psychological operations (PSYOP) in Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) have shown the significant challenges that media-austere operating environments can pose to reaching the target audience. A media-austere operating environment is defined here as one where the media broadcast means, namely television and radio, are severely degraded following military operations, or have not yet developed into maturity, and where the target audience (TA) does not have access to the equipment (television or radio sets) necessary to receive the broadcast message. Successful video PSYOP in media austere operating environments require modern and versatile tactical video dissemination means that complement tactical operations and adhere to force-protection constraints to bring video products directly to the TA.

While the video medium is one of the most powerful means of communicating PSYOP messages, successful dissemination of PSYOP video has generally required an extant television network and a developed and ready television viewing audience. In media-rich environments, video PSYOP is typically broadcast to a TA that is already tuned-in for normal programming. PSYOP programming can be delivered to the TA by either over-powering the normal signal or broadcasting on channels not in use in a non-permissive environment, or by purchasing or acquiring airtime in either a semi-permissive or permissive environment. In operating environments where such a network and viewing audience is not developed, tactical means for dissemination must fill the gap.

Effective broadcast dissemination of radio and television PSYOP in media-austere operating environments necessitates either the re-construction of damaged broadcasting facilities, or the employment of military radio and television broadcasting systems like the Special Operations Media System (SOMS-B for the latest "B" version), or the EC-130 *Commando Solo*.   The reach of ground-based transmitters is limited by the effects of terrain, the number of transmitters that may be erected, protected, equipped, and manned, while the limitations on aerial transmitters are primarily broadcast range and flight time.  However, video broadcast operations cannot reach a TA that does not have access to TV.

In broadcast radio PSYOP, it is generally practical to distribute radio receivers to the TA.  While battery-operated portable FM radios can be obtained very cheaply for distribution to the TAs to overcome the equipment shortage, this is certainly not the case for television sets.  Even if television sets could be distributed cheaply, the broadcast range of television signals is significantly less than that of radio.  Because of the short range of TV signals, effective long-term broadcasting operations would require the installation of repeaters or additional broadcast facilities and crews to operate them. Whatever broadcast system is employed, portions of the TA will still be out of reach because they are either outside the range of the broadcast system, or lack access to a receiver.  These portions of the TA represent a "denied audience" for which PSYOP forces require dissemination capabilities that employ other than broadcast means to deliver video products.

In a media-austere environment, there is no indigenous programming that draws the TA to the medium to provide opportunities to send PSYOP messages, nor is there an

existing broadcast infrastructure that can be co-opted.  Instead, tailor-made video products must be delivered on-site, in remote villages, military bases, and cities, to small audiences using tactical dissemination systems operated by PSYOP soldiers.  The absence of video programming in a media austere environment also makes it difficult for PSYOP forces to attract and subsequently keep the TA's attention for subsequent engagements.  In order to draw the TA to the medium, PSYOP forces need supporting video programming that is appropriate to the TA. To employ video PSYOP in media-austere operating environments, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must acquire both special-purpose tactical video dissemination systems and supporting and supplemental video programming appropriate to the culture of the TA to attract and reach the TA.   Currently, the exploitation of the video media in austere operating environments lacking a mature television infrastructure exceeds U.S. PSYOP capabilities.

# Chapter 2

# The Anticipated Revolution in PSYOP

In the late 1990s, the PSYOP community was oriented on transforming PSYOP in both audio-visual and computer-network media. The National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies1996 Strategic Assessment predicted that "cyberspace may become the battlespace of the information warrior," and laid out the new technological means available to PSYOP that were considered "unimaginable even in the mid-1980s."[1] The intersection of Information-Age technology enabling the expansion and sophistication of networks and the rapid growth and reach of mass media were expected to have significant impact on the effectiveness of PSYOP.[2]

The U.S. PSYOP community was grappling with the challenge of operating in sophisticated media environments employing a doctrine more suited to third-world primitive media environments that were primarily print and radio. The technical aspects of the challenge are well documented in MAJ Stephen C. Larsen's 1999 Command and General Staff College Masters Thesis entitled "Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated Media Environments."[3] Essentially, the new task was to successfully compete in media-saturated operating environments where the PSYOP message and product was one of several choices available to the TA. Savvy and sophisticated video

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[1] National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Studies, *1996 Strategic Assessment, Elements Of U.S. Power,* Fort Leslie J. McNair, U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1996, p. 154. Viewable at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/StrategicAssessments/Sa96/SA96.pdf
[2] CDR Randall G. Bowdish, USN, "Information-Age Psychological Operations," *Military Review,* Dec98-Feb99, Vol. 78, Issue 6, p. 30.

PSYOP would be required to reach the TA via television in the mature and sophisticated media-rich operating environments, such as the former Yugoslavia.  In U.S. and NATO peace support and combat operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, PSYOP products had to overcome both media competition from established programming and secure audience interest in an already saturated medium.

In October 1999, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics established the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations in Time of Military Conflict (hereinafter "DSB Task Force").  One of the DSB Task Force findings in its May 2000 report was that in future operations, U.S. video PSYOP will "need to compete against a very large menu of commercial TV channels."[4] The Task Force concluded that in the face of such competition, "it will become increasingly difficult for the PSYOP community to acquire 'mindshare' in its target audiences."[5]  The general prediction in the late 1990s, was that it would be very unlikely that U.S. PSYOP could operate in a media environment where it would be "the only show in town" due to either rules-of-engagement prohibiting jamming of the competition, or due to third country media broadcast bleed-over.[6]

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[3] MAJ Stephen C. Larsen, U.S. Army,  "Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated Media Environments," Masters thesis submitted to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 June 1999, DTIC document #19990909338

[4] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict,* May 2000, Washington D.C., p. 30.  Hereafter cited as the DSB PSYOP Task Force Report.  Viewable at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/psyop.pdf

[5] DSB PSYOP Task Force Report, p. 37.

[6] MAJ Larsen, p. 67.

The DSB Task Force focused intently on the anticipated revolution in PSYOP that would be made possible by major changes in telecommunications and media technology. Chapter 4 of the DSB Task Force report discussed at length the new means of transmitting or disseminating information that were beyond the then-current capabilities or policy restrictions of U.S. PSYOP, but which had the potential for exploitation to disseminate PSYOP messages to TAs. These new capabilities consisted of the Internet (e.g. web sites, e-mail, chat-rooms, real-time video and audio streams, which create virtual TV and radio stations on the web, and wireless messaging); the cable TV market; High-Definition TV broadcasting; digital audio broadcasting; satellite TV and Radio; the use of telephony such as pagers, cellular telephones, and wireless PDAs, and; the cross-over between computer technology and telephony, (computer telephony integration, which combines the database functions of computers with voice and/or facsimile transmission systems).[7] These new forms of pinpoint delivery communications systems, particularly the Internet, could be precisely targeted and were expected to enable the Joint warfighting concept of *precision engagement* in PSYOP to achieve "precise effects in cyberspace, as well as … directed psychological operations for greatest influence."[8]

The growth of computers played another role in facilitating a revolution in PSYOP, namely that of improving command, control, and support of deployed PSYOP forces. Gary Whitley explored this aspect in his U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, entitled "PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century." The report assessed

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[7] DSB PSYOP Task Force Report, p. 37.
[8] William S. Cohen, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress,* Chapter 10, The Revolution In Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010
http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr1999/chap10.html

the future of U.S. PSYOP and predicted that the growth in computer media would make the Internet "the vehicle to enable a revolution in PSYOP."[9]  The focus was on improving command, control and intelligence and providing product development support of forward-deployed PSYOP forces.  The key enabler for improving PSYOP effectiveness was the "Reachback" concept, whereby forward-deployed forces could use secure communications networks to get product development, target analysis, and assessment support from the 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The concept of Reachback "is dependent upon an enormous amount of bandwith through secure communications links," which the computing revolution was expected to deliver.[10]  Presently, this command and control and product support aspects of the revolution in PSYOP have been largely achieved in the PSYOP Distribution System (PDS) and Digital video dissemination system (DVDS) which provides point-to-point product exchange capabilities.[11]

**The Bow Wave of the PSYOP Revolution: Peace Enforcement in the Balkans**

In the Bosnian civil war, all of the warring factions usurped or heavily co-opted their indigenous television networks and exploited the Western TV media in pursuit of their propaganda objectives.[12]  Further, television transmitting and re-broadcasting stations were high-priority military targets; the seizure or loss of which meant winning or

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[9] Gary L. Whitley, Department of the Navy, "PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century," a Strategy Research Project submitted to the U.S. Army War College,  10 April 2000, DTIC #20000607149, p. 18.
[10] DSB Task Force, p. 13.
[11] LTC Carl Phillips, U.S. Army, Commander, 9th PSYOP Battalion, E-mail to the author , 20 March 2004.  See also Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30 *Psychological Operations,* USGPO, Washington D.C., 19 June 2000, (hereafter cited as Field Manual 3-05.30), Appendix C "Digitization of PSYOP Forces,"
[12] Kevin Avruch, James L. Narel, and Pacale Combelles Siegal, *Information Campaigns for Peace Operations,* DoD Command and Control Research Program, Washington D.C., February 2000, p. 40. See

losing in the propaganda wars.[13]  Entering into the conflict to enforce the Dayton Peace

Accord as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR), U.S. PSYOP forces were challenged

with producing video PSYOP products that could compete with the civilian market.

During Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE,

U.S. and Coalition forces operated in a mature media environment where video products

were readily inserted into the existing television broadcast network for dissemination,

tucked into a larger body of pre-existing and continuing programS of local and regional

content and flavor.  By March 1997, IFOR and the following Stabilization Force (SFOR)

had already produced 51 television PSYOP video products for dissemination through

local TV stations throughout the theater of operations.[14]  During Operation JOINT

ENDEAVOR, the 1st Infantry Division established the capability to do live TV

interviews to send command messages to the TA.[15]  To compete effectively with civilian-

produced video in support of the NATO information campaign, U.S. PSYOP forces even

hired civilian videographers and employed state-of-the-art video equipment.[16]

In the Kosovo Campaign, during Operation ALLIED FORCE, U.S. and NATO

forces were surprised by the Internet campaign waged by Serbia.  The government of

Serbian President Slobodon Milosevic employed hundreds of pro-Serb web sites, which

effectively disseminated the message of Serbian propaganda both regionally and

generally, pages 31-108 of the Chapter entitled "Bosnia-Herzegovina Information Campaign" for a
detailed account.
[13] Ibid., p. 38.  See also LTC Steven Collins, "Army PSYOP in Bosnia, Capabilities and Constraints,"
*Parameters,* Vol. 29, No. 2, n.p.  Viewable at:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99summer/collins.htm
[14] Pascalle Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations,*
Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Washington DC: NDU Press,
1998, p 74.
[15] LTC Stephen W. Shanahan, U.S. Army (Ret), and LTC Gary Beavers, U.S. Army, "Information
Operations in Bosnia," *Military Review,* Vol. LXXVII, No. 6, November-December 1997, pp. 53-62.
[16] MAJ Stephen C. Larsen, p. 58.

internationally.[17]  The Serbian regime demonstrated its flexibility in exploiting the new

media, and did so faster than NATO forces could respond with counter-propaganda, with

the result that the Serbs maintained the initiative in the information realm.  MAJ Angela

Lungu, writing on the role of the Internet in PSYOP observed that the Internet permits

enemies to act asymmetrically in the information realm and achieve strategic results for

minimal investment to influence public opinion and incite regional hostility against the

United States.[18]

The Milosevic regime employed the Internet to globally post "propaganda

depicting Serb victims, bombings in violation of international law, and NATO [in the role

of] aggressors."[19]  In the process, the Serbs accomplished strategic PSYOP objectives at

almost no cost.  While Serb television and radio had been shut down by the NATO air

campaign, the Serbs still got their messages through the international media, which

reinforced the spread of Internet propaganda by reporting the claims being made by the

Serbs.  The Serb use of the Internet to compete on a regional and strategic level

demonstrates that a media-rich operating environment will demand a high level of

flexibility and versatility from friendly information operations, to include PSYOP.

Employing video PSYOP to reach the Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Serbian

Kosovo, NATO forces developed a 60 to 90-minute program entitled "Allied Voice

Radio and Television," which was "a mix of news, music and features related to the

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[17] Richard Lardner, "Warfighting Strategy In Iraq Tied To Aggressive Media Campaign," InsideDefense.com, May 6, 2003, viewable at www.inside.defense.com

[18] MAJ Angela Maria Lungu, "WAR.com - The Internet and Psychological Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring-Summer 2001, No. 28, p. 13.   Viewable at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0628.pdf

conflict. Video and audio programs focused on the atrocities being committed in

Kosovo."[20]  The video programs were targeted at both sides: the Serbian military

personnel and civilians, and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and in refugee camps.  After

shutting down Serbian television in a counter-propaganda mode, NATO continued to

broadcast this program for weeks after the end of the air campaign in June 1999, as it was

the only way to reach the populations comprising the TAs.  While the PSYOP operating

environment in the Balkans seemed to point the way to the future, many argued that the

future operating environment would likely be "low-tech" and thus require a different set

of delivery means and methods.[21]

[19] LTC Donna G. Boltz, "Information Technology and Peace Support Operations," released Online 22 July 2002 by the United States Institute of Peace and viewable at
http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/13.html
[20] Harold Kennedy,  "Psyops Units Encouraged to Modernize Their Equipment," *National Defense,* February 2001, viewable at: http://nationaldefense.ndia.org/article.cfm?Id=425
[21] Capt Alex Berger,  "The Low-Tech Side of Information Warfare" *Air & Space Power Chronicles* on-line journal, viewable at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/berger.html

## Chapter 3
## Video PSYOP

### Characteristics of Video PSYOP

According to Field Manual 33-1 *Psychological Operations,*, the term "video" refers to "the technical process of producing magnetic tapes that have both visual and sound effects."[22] Throughout this paper, the term "Video PSYOP" includes the production and dissemination of all PSYOP products prepared on videocassettes, Digital Video Disc (DVD) or video compact-disc (VCD) computer-video that are intended to be viewed on a television screen, computer screen, or projector. The term "television" in conjunction with video PSYOP likewise includes all video imagery displayed on television sets, whether by broadcast means or hard-copy video PSYOP products.

> *"Television is a proven means of persuasion worldwide and, therefore a vital asset in PSYOP dissemination. TV appeals to a number of senses, making it the closest medium to face-to-face communication."* [23]
>
> U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.301

Video media provide PSYOP forces "… a powerful means of persuasion…[which] can elicit a high degree of recall."[24] PSYOP products properly prepared and disseminated in the video media are vivid and are not perceived as propaganda: research has demonstrated that most audiences perceive the products as

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[22] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures,* Field Manual 33-1-1, Washington DC, 5 May 1994, p. 11-6. Hereafter cited as Field Manual 33-1-1. While Field Manual 3-05.30 has superseded this manual, the tactics remain sound and the 2003 version does not define the term.

[23] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301,*Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, USGPO, Washington D.C., 31 December 2003, (hereafter cited as Field Manual 3-05.301), p. 10-16, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, Field Manual 33-1-1, Washington D.C., 18 February 1993 (hereafter cited as Field Manual 33-1) p. 10-11, which is worded slightly differently.

[24] Field Manual 33-1-1, p. 9-4.

factual and accurate.[25]  Modern U.S. video PSYOP were first employed in the Vietnam

War at the operational level over a four-station network under the control of the Joint

U.S. Public Affairs Office.[26]  Current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for

showing video PSYOP products at the tactical level have their genesis in the techniques

used to show PSYOP film products which, prior to the advent of Video PSYOP in the

1970s, was the only effective medium used to reproduce events with movement.[27]

Capabilities for tactical dissemination of video PSYOP improved dramatically with the

advent of the video recorder and videocassette player technologies, which allowed for

both pinpoint distribution and simultaneous broadcasting from multiple transmitter sites.

    In situations where the TA is beyond the range of the broadcast signal, lack

access to television sets, or where no electrical power is available, the TA may be

considered a "denied audience." Most discussions of denied audiences focus on

limitations imposed by geographic distance, enemy threats, such as air-defense means,

and or physical access to the TA.[28]  However, whether due to the lack of infrastructure,

limitations in broadcasting capabilities or the absence of receivers in the TA, any of these

conditions can effectively close off the TA from receiving the message via broadcast

means.   Under these conditions, PSYOP doctrine suggests that TPTs bring the video

product to the TA in a tactical mode via point dissemination means.

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[25] Frank Stetch, "Winning CNN Wars," *Parameters,* Vol. 24, Autumn 1994, n.p.  Viewable at:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1994/stech.htm
[26] Terry F. Greene, Defense Intelligence Agency,  "U.S. Army Psychological Operations into the Year
2000," a U.S. Army War College Studies Program Paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15 April 1993, pp. 4-8.
[27] Field Manual, 33-1-1, p. 10-11.
[28] SAIC, Joint *Psychological Operations Enhancement Study,* p. 4-2-1.  In explaining the concept of "deep
and denied areas" the report notes that "…access to the audience cab be limited by geographic distance,
and air defense threats, especially in non-permissive or hostile environments."

*Television, flexible and immediate, can be broadcast live and present events such as news, sports, and entertainment or use prerecorded programs or videotape. The advent of the videocassette recorder and home video camera have made it possible to create and show a presentation on television without using outside production facilities.*[29]

Field Manual 33-1-1

In operating environments where television sets are rare or unevenly distributed, or where electricity is unavailable or unreliable, doctrine suggests that television receivers may be set up in public places to receive the broadcast signal.[30] A field-proven TTP to reach audiences without access to television is to employ pre-recorded video presentations on remote television sets independent of broadcasting facilities.[31] An advantage of PSYOP Video products is that they "can be studied in private or in small groups and can be kept secret," which is especially important in situations where factional violence is prevalent.[32] The TTPs to reach denied audiences generally employ "low-tech" means to reach denied audiences in a media that normally requires an established broadcast network. During OEF, the 82[d] Airborne Division employed generator-powered, VHS cassette capable television sets to show video products to small audiences.

A demonstration of the power of low-tech distribution of PSYOP to denied audiences is clearly seen in the model employed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, who while in exile, effectively distributed his messages to TAs in Iran via audio cassette tapes. Employing the latest personal communication technology of the day, Khomeini's audiocassettes were distributed clandestinely in Iran where they were "extensively copied

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[29] Field Manual 33-1-1, p. 9-2.
[30] Ibid, p. 9-4, and Field Manual 3-05.301, p. 10-16
[31] Field Manual 33-1, p. 9-4. Field Manual 3-05.301, p. 10-18.
[32] Field Manual 33-1, p. 9-4.

and played over the telephone lines," and distributed in secret.[33]  In the face of censorship and exile that denied direct access to the TA, Khomeini's application of the low-tech approach was effective and resulted in a full-scale Islamic revolution that ousted the Shah and swept Khomeini into power.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden attempted to employ the similar techniques with video tapes, which in addition to clandestine distribution, were also broadcast by sympathetic Arab-speaking news networks, such as *Al Jazeera*, reaching as many as 34 million viewers of the Muslim world in the Middle East.[34]  A professional analysis of one Al Qaeda recruitment video found that Osama bin Laden "is capable if using both the techniques and the professional production skills of the modern television industry to convey his message."[35]  Bin Laden's video taped messages allowed him to reach his TA and inspired others to produce supplementary propaganda products in videocassette form with such titles as 'Soldiers of Allah' which of course could be disseminated in the same manner and spread via low-tech point distribution means to Islamic fundamentalists worldwide in support of Al Qaeda objectives.[36]  Al Qaeda's prolific use of video products to reach its TAs proves the effectiveness of the media and demonstrates that our adversaries will compete head-to-head against our efforts to employ video PSYOP, even under "low-tech" conditions.

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[33] Christopher R. Kedzie, Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent Dictator's Dilemma, the RAND Corporation, 1997, Chapter 2, n.p., viewable at: http://www.rand.org/publications/RGSD/RGSD127/sec2.html#fnB6

[34] D.D. Chipman, "Osama bin Laden and Guerilla War," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* Taylor & Francis Group, 2003, p. 166.

[35] Analysis by Richard Williams Bulliet of Columbia University in Field Manual 3-05.301, p. 11-14.

[36] Kedzie, op. cit.

**Obsolescence of Tactical PSYOP Video Dissemination Means**

Writing in 1998, former Air Force pilot, CNN correspondent and current IO

analyst Chuck de Caro was critical of "obsolete [PSYOP] doctrine and technologies" and

observed that in regards to preparing and disseminating video PSYOP products "little can

be accomplished with the current antiquated PSYOP system."[37]  In 1999 the Joint

Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Information Operations Panel assessed the

ability of the PSYOP community to perform its dissemination mission.   The JWCA IO

Panel found that U.S. PSYOP lacked adequate capabilities to produce commercial-

quality video PSYOP products, and to disseminate those products to denied audiences.[38]

These deficiencies were again confirmed in a study commissioned by the Joint Staff J39

in June 1999 which recommended that USSOCOM "modernize PSYOP production

systems particularly television."[39]  Interestingly, both reports focused primarily on

broadcasting PSYOP video products on television over the airwaves, rather than on

tactical point dissemination systems, but U.S. PSYOP forces urgently needed to

modernize or replace existing systems to achieve a non-broadcast dissemination

capability.

The primary system in the U.S. inventory designated for tactical point

dissemination of video products in other than broadcast mode is the AN/MSQ-85B

Mobile Audiovisual Information Collection and Dissemination System.  Few of the

AN/MSQ-85B still exist in their original configuration, and these are more museum

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[37] Chuck de Caro, "SOFTWAR" as reprinted in the US Air Force Command and Staff College Distance Learning Air Campaign Planning, AC507, Emerging Technology,  ACSC Distance Learning Multimedia Edition Version 2.1, June 1998.

[38] Science Applications International Corporation, (SAIC) Strategies Group, *Joint Psychological Operations Enhancement Study*, June 1999, McLean Virginia, p. ii.  Report prepared for the Joint Staff J39.

pieces of 1970s technology, than usable equipment.  The individual components of the

AN/MSQ-85B include an AQ-4A movie projector, AN/UIH-6 public address system,

AP-9 slide projector, AN/USH two track international standard tape recorder, BM-22A

large projection screen and R-520A/UUR radio receiver.[40]



**Figure 1 AN/MSQ-85B Mobile Audiovisual Information Collection and
Dissemination System**

While a pristine example of the AN/MSQ-85B had been prominently displayed at the

Army Transformation Exercise at Fort Irwin, CA, as part of Joint Forces Command's

Millennium Challenge Experiment in July and August 2002, most of the systems in the

U.S. inventory have been completely stripped of their equipment and converted to other

uses, namely command and control and product development shelters.  In FY 2000, when

units of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) attempted to refurbish two

MSQ-85Bs, they discovered that the needed repair parts were no longer in the Army

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[39] SAIC, *Joint Psychological Operations Enhancement Study*, p. 1-8.

supply system.[41] This meant that replacement parts had to be individually tooled and manufactured to complete the refurbishment – a cost prohibitive proposition.   The obsolescence of the MSQ-85B has left U.S. forces without a reliable and available means for pinpoint distribution of PSYOP video products in media-austere operating environments.

## The Role of Video PSYOP in the Continuum of Military Operations

Video PSYOP are conducted at both the operational and tactical levels of military operations.  Operational video PSYOP is generally accomplished through broadcast means to a wide audience, while tactical level video PSYOP may employ broadcast and other dissemination means to a smaller audience. Video PSYOP, at both the operational and tactical levels are employed in support of combat operations, post-combat operations, and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).  The effectiveness of Video PSYOP is a function of the ability of the friendly force to control the broadcast frequencies to transmit a signal, as well as the TA's access to the means to receive it, viz. television sets and electric power.

During combat operations, U.S. Forces are operating in a non-permissive environment, opposed by enemy forces who may block access to the TA. To reach an audience so denied, U.S. PSYOP may over-power existing TV signals and co-opt the channels the TA routinely tunes in to, or it can select a new frequency to avoid competition.  Through physical destruction operations, the friendly force may apply

[40] Scott R. Gourley, "PSYOP The most effective non-lethal weapon there is." Special Operations Technology on-line, Volume: 1, Issue: 5, Dec 31, 2003.  Viewable at:  http://www.sotech-kmi.com/archive_article.cfm?DocID=248

combat power to destroy or temporarily disable enemy broadcast means to defeat enemy propaganda. Broadcasting from aerial platforms, on the ground the ground in the combat zone, or from the territory of friendly third country states, the reach of the video PSYOP message is limited to the effective range of the ground or air broadcast platform. The range and effective reach of the broadcast signal is in turn limited by both terrrain effects and transmitter output power, and by enemy efforts to interfere with reception by either electronic-protect counter-actions or procedural controls.[42]

Video PSYOP is an important component in Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Peace Support Operations (PSO) as well as the post-combat operations Follow Through phase. PSYOP conducted in these scenarios is operating in a semi-permissive environment where existing idigenous government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the U.S. operation, may not be in control of the territory and population where the unit is operating. HA and PSO are often conducted in semi-permissive environments. In semi-permissive environments, either post-combat, HA, or PSO, U.S. PSYOP soldiers may be able to co-opt government-owned television and radio broadcasting stations, or to purchase access on commercial stations to broadcast their video and audio messages. Peace operations conducted in operating environments with established television networks typically require a long-term PSYOP broadcasting presence. In these conditions, U.S. PSYOP forces can broadcast a TV signal from organic transmitters such as the SOMS-B, however, these systems are high-demand/low-density systems.

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[41] U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Initial Capabilities Document for Mobile Audio-Visual System, , 18 July 2003.
[42] In many foreign governments, control over television broadcasting and frequency management falls to the security services. Governments may limit the reception capabilities of imported sets, so that they are

The general type of PSYOP conducted after major combat operations have concluded, or in PSO is known as "consolidation PSYOP."  "Consolidation PSYOP is executed in foreign areas inhabited by enemy or hostile populations and occupied by U.S. forces, or in areas where U.S. forces are based."[43]  Consolidation PSYOP "facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operation."[44]  PSYOP in HA and PSO operations is similar to Consolidation PSYOP, as it shares the connection to civil-military operations and the need to communicate to the population to facilitate control and accomplish the humanitarian or peace operations mission.  Video PSYOP is an effective means to explain on-going civil-military operations to TAs in conjunction with the PSYOP mission.

set to receive only-government owned channels.  Additionally, governments may attempt to impose censorship laws to prevent the TA from viewing broadcasts.  See Field Manual 3-05.301, p. 10-16.
[43] Jeffrey P. Jones and Michael P. Matthews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Summer 1995, No. 8, p. 29.
[44] Field Manual 33-1, p. 3-5.

## Chapter 4

## Media-Austere Operating Environments

Media austere operating environments are those in which the broadcast means, primarily television and radio, are severely degraded following military operations, or have not yet developed into maturity, and where the TA does not have access to the equipment (television or radio sets) necessary to receive the broadcast message. U.S. PSYOP forces have faced this challenge in several operations over the last decade. A short review of three operations conducted in the poverty-stricken and media-austere conditions in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan where the TAs were largely illiterate, serve to illustrate the challenges of conducting PSYOP under the conditions of a media-austere environment.

## Operation PROVIDE HOPE in Somalia

Launched in December 1992, Operation PROVIDE HOPE, was a U.S. led, UN Coaltion humanitarian assistance mission in Somalia, intended to counter years of famine that was devastating the country. The combination of an illiterate society, continuing violence in the form of a brutal civil war, national famine, and the absence of functioning media all made Somalia the prototypical media-austere operating environment during the U.S. led humanitarian operations there. After years of anarchy, there were no operating television or radio stations when operations commenced.[45] The complete breakdown of the federal government and several years of civil war had

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[45] SGM Karen Murdock, "Building a Field Newspaper: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures from Operations PROVIDE HOPE – Somalia," *Training Quarterly,* 4-98, viewable at https://call2.army.mil/call/products/trngqtr/tq4-98/murdock.asp

ravaged the national and local media and communications infrastructures. The public

telecommunications system had been destroyed or dismantled leaving only a few Somalis

with access to the outside world via radiotelephone or ship-to-shore communications

(INMARSAT) or satellite telephones.[46] The combination of the low Somali literacy rate

of only twenty-four percent, the absence of a functioning telecommunications systems,

and a debilitated print and broadcast media, ensured that the TA of Somali adults would

be difficulte for PSYOP to reach.[47]

Psychological operations were used extensively to support HA operations in

Somalia where PSYOP troops ran a local newspaper and radio station both called *Rajo,*

or "the truth" in Somali.[48] Radio *Rajo* operations were constrained by the lack of

material to broadcast other than the PSYOP messages in Newspaper *Rajo*, and

broadcasted only for forty-five minutes, twice a day.[49] The content of the newspaper

relied heavily on the United States Information Agency's daily *Wireless File* news report

sent to the United States Liason Office in Mogadishu.[50] According to a U.S, Institute of

Peace Report, the PSYOP newspaper and radio programs "represented the first real

communications the Somalis had for two to four years."[51] Video PSYOP products were

not used in this operation as the newspaper and radio programs were difficult enough to

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[46] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs October 2003 Background Note: Somalia
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm
[47] Ibid.
[48] Richard W. Stewart. *The United States Army in Somalia,* Center for Military History, CMH Pub 70–81–1, 2002. Viewable at: http://www.army.mil/CMH-pg/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm
[49] United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 21, *Managing Communications Lessons from Interventions in Africa,* March 1997, hereafter cited as USIP Special Report 21. Viewable at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/managingcomm2.html
[50] Cynthia G, Efird and Carl T. Sahlin Jr., "Using the Information Instrument to Leverage Military Force: A Need for Deliberate Interagency Coordination," a Research Project Report, National War College, National Defense University, Class of 1994, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington D.C., pp. 32-35.
[51] USIP Special Report 21, n.p.

maintain in the face of technological challenges and lack of content, and few had access to a television set.

## Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti

Launched in 1996, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was a peacekeeping operation intended to reinstate exiled President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power and enforce the provisions of the peace agreement, the Governor's Island Accord. Haiti is another example of a media-austere envrionment where those who cannot read, and are without access to either television or radio may be considered a denied audience. The combination of poverty and illiteracy created a population heavily dependent on broadcast media to get information. The U.S. State Department concluded that "broadcast media, especially Creole-language radio, have an unusual importance," in Haiti given that the adult literacy rate was about 20 percent.[52]

During the three years of the Cedras regime in Haiti brought to a close by Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, media freedoms were under attack by the government: some radio stations were challenged to continue operations as radio journalists were "murdered... menaced, beaten and arrested."[53] Even in the face of such censhorship, radio stations did broadcast in Haiti, and were the primary means of getting news in Haitian society. Even with a functioning radio network, it was necessary to air-

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[52] United States Department of State, Haiti Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 1999. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor February 23, 2000, hereafter cited as DoS 1999 Haiti Country Report. Viewable at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/391.htm)

[53] Bob Shacochis, "Letter from Haiti," *Columbia Journalism Review,* Published by the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University, July/August 1995, n.p. Viewable at http://archives.cjr.org/year/95/4/haiti.asp

drop over 10,000 radios to enable the Haitian people to hear the daily PSYOP radio

broadcasts transmitted from Commando Solo (then known as *Volant Solo*).[54]

Leading the information campaign at the operational-strategic level was the

United States Information Service.  U.S. PSYOP supported the USIS by packaging the

themes and messages for delivery by Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs).  The USIS wanted

"infomercials" to get the word out quickly about U.S. Civil Afairs Ministerial Advisory

Team (MAT)  plans and works accomplished.[55]  Army peace operations doctrine assigns

PSYOP an important role in facilitating cooperation between the peace operation forces

belligerent parties and the populace through the use of local information programs

supported by  radio or television newscasts in addition to traditional print products

distribution.[56]  During the transition phase from the Multi-National Force to the United

Nations Mission in Haiti, PSYOP employed a multi-media campaign to raise popular

support for the UN.  This multidi-media campaign included television PSYOP, in

addition to, radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, leaflets, handbills and Tactical

Dissemination Team loudspeaker operations.[57]

At the time of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the Haitian television

network was anemic, making dissemination of video products in Haiti very problematic.

Poverty is the greatest constraint to the development of a mature television-viewing

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[54] Herbert A. Friedman, "U.S. PSYOP in Haiti (Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY), viewable at
http://www.psywarior.com/HerbHaiti.html, n.p.
[55] Stephen D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation Uphold Democracy," Military Review No. 76, September-
October 1996. p. 70.
[56] Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort
Monroe VA, *Peace Ops: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace
Operations,* FM 3-07.31 (formerly 100-23), USGPO, 26 October 2003, pp. VI-6 and  D-1.  See also
Headquarters, Dept of the Army, *Peace Operations,* FM 100-23, USGPO, Washington D.C., 30 December
1994, p. 40.

audience in Hait where most people do not have access to television due to financial constraints.[58]  Because of the small size of the nation, both radio and TV broadcasting efforts from the airborne transmitter on Commando Solo can attain effective coverage. However, an underdeveloped television infrastructure and terrible poverty meant that few Haitians had access to televisions and reaching the TA with video PSYOP would be difficult.  Video PSYOP was employed at the operational level, although not to the extent of  radio PSYOP.

## Afghanistan

On the continuum of media-rich to media-austere operating environments, Afghanistan is close to the absolute end of the austere side of the scale.  With a literacy rate of between 25-30%, radio and television have more impact than a printed product for the average Afghan.[59] Radio broadcasting in the region began with BBC World Service, which broadcast in Persian to the region beginning in 1940.  Programming focused specifically on Afghanistan in Persian and Pashto began only in 1981, after the Soviet invasion.[60]  All Afghan broadcast media were severely damaged during years of civil war and under Taliban rule.  Seventy-five percent of Afghanistan's medium-wave radio

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[57] Stephen D. Brown, p. 72.
[58] DoS 1999 Haiti Country Report.
[59] C. H. Briscoe, "Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP Teams in Afghanistan," *Special Warfare,* September 2002, p. 38.
[60] Chris Gill, "Afghanistan Media Reconstruction in Focus," a paper presented to the 7th Annual GATE Conference, Paris France, 20 September 2002, p. 3.

transmitters were either destroyed or inoperable and all of the country's six short wave radio transmitters were also ruined.[61]

Television broadcasting in Afghanistan began in 1978 as a pilot service in the major cities. Before the fall of the Najibullah regime and the ultimate rise of the Taliban out of the chaos that ensued, Afghanistan had at least ten television broadcast stations broadcasting in nine of the country's 30 provinces.[62] When the Taliban came to power, all TV broadcasting was ended by decree. What limited TV equipment that has survived the Taliban regime is completely obsolete, with the majority of the equipment being 25 years old and incorporating vacuum tube technology for which repair parts are in many cases no longer manufactured or are non-existent.[63] In October 2002, the few remaining TV stations in Afghanistan often lacked cameras and microphones, and in some cases electricity and telephone service.[64] A 2002 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) news release reported, "…after a ten year absence of any TV, the Afghan people are eager to watch [video] programming."[65]

For most of OEF, working televisions in Afghanistan have been scarce, being concentrated in just a handful of cities. According to recent media market analyses, 85% of the population lives in 37,000 villages without access to television in a nation where

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[61] Marc Nathanson, Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors, National Press Club Afternoon Newsmaker Program, Wednesday, June 26, 2002, viewable at: http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/wwwh02062802.html

[62] Department of Defense, Country Handbook: Afghanistan, October 2001, DoD publication DOD-2630-AFG-001-02, p. 27.

[63] Chris Gill, p. 5.

[64] United States Institute of Peace, "Free and Independent Media: A Forgotten Aspect of Afghan Recovery?," N.P. October 3, 2002, viewable at: http://www.usip.org/newsmedia/releases/2002/nb20021003.html

[65] UNESCO News, "Afghanistan Television Receives International Programmes Package," May 10, 2002, viewable at http://www.unesco.org/webworld/news/2002/020510_creatv.shtml

only 4-10% of households have electricity.[66]  The few television stations now able to broadcast lack both current material and an ability to produce new material.[67]  A year after the U.S. initiated combat operations in Afghanistan, only 6 television stations were back on the air in Afghanistan in the cities of Herat, Qandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Faizabad, Kabul, and Jalalabad.[68]  The broadcasting footprint of each of these stations was limited, at most, to the city limits, leaving the rest of the country without TV reception.  In the countryside, the population has, in many cases, never seen televisions and there is no organic means available for the TA to view video products.  Further, TV broadcasting in Afghanistan in the winter of 2002/2003 was limited to just a few hours a day at most stations, due to inconsistent electric power, a dearth of programming, and antiquated equipment in constant need of repair and maintenance.

It was under the media-austere conditions described above that U.S. PSYOP forces in Afghanistan were to employ video products to get their message to the TA and overcome the handicaps imposed by both the high illiteracy rate and war-damaged and undeveloped media infrastructure.  Parallel to the military's video PSYOP effort, the civilian use of non-broadcast means to view video products increased dramatically. Videocassettes quickly re-emerged as a source of video programming for Afghans, at least for those who owned or had access to electricity, a television, and a VCR.

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[66] Bruce Girard, "The Potential for Community Radio in Afghanistan," Report sponsored by the Communication Assistance Foundation, Communica,  5 November, 2002, p. ii.  Viewable at http://comunica.org/afghanistan/cr_afghan.pdf

[67] Whitney Azoy and Don North, *Afghan Media Assessment Team – Final Report and Recommendations*, The Rendon Group, May 22, 2002, p. 14.

[68] Ibid.

In illiterate societies, video PSYOP products can deliver the message to the masses without loss of clarity. The 82$^d$ Airborne Division's experience with printed PSYOP products, such as newspapers and leaflets in Afghanistan showed that, they were often read aloud by one of the few literate villagers to their neighbors, sometimes with deliberate falsehoods sprinkled in, sometimes with errors in understanding, and sometimes with impromptu redaction. The dramatic return and proliferation of video shops in Afghanistan demonstrates the popularity of video programs in an illiterate society. By September 2002, there were approximately one hundred video shops in Qandahar, the former heart of the Taliban regime, which, according to local reports began to open the day the Americans arrived.[69] The need for video entertainment in Afghanistan has produced a thriving market for mostly illegal copies of films on videocassettes and DVDs.[70] The rapid growth of the market for video products reveals an opportunity for US PSYOP to exploit with video products.

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[69] Voice of America Editorial "Commerce Comes to Kandahar," 29 September 2002, viewable at
http://www.ibb.gov/editorials/10158.htm
[70] Bruce Girard, op. cit., p. 10.

## Chapter 5

## Tactical Video PSYOP Dissemination Capabilities and Limitations

PSYOP doctrine envisions PSYOP Broadcast Companies reaching TAs with video products via over-the-air broadcast means on existing host-nation or forward-deployed U.S. military broadcast platforms operated by PSYOP broadcast personnel.[71] In a media-austere environment such as Afghanistan, the absence of both a HN broadcasting capability and a readily available television audience has meant that video PSYOP has become a point-delivery proposition.

The Tactical PSYOP Companies (TPC) of the Tactical PSYOP Battalions (POBs) can disseminate video products only with augmentation. While current PSYOP doctrine continues to list the AN/MSQ-85B as an asset organic to the TPC for disseminating video products, the reality is that none remain in the 4th POG in their original configuration.[72] The TPCs are not equipped to develop and produce video products in the field, and would require augmentation in the form of deployable video teams from the Broadcast PSYOP Company of the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB) to accomplish this task.[73] According to recent Army PSYOP doctrine in Field Manual 33-1, TPCs disseminate primarily via "tactical PSYOP products…loudspeaker messages, handbills, leaflets, and face-to-face communications." [74] Currently, the TPC's subordinate Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) lack any organic tactical dissemination means for video products by organizational design. The TPTs in OEF were already heavily tasked to support

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[71] Field Manual 3-05.30, p. 6-17 and Field Manual 33-1, p. 4-8.
[72] E-mail to the author, LTC Carl Phillips, Commander, 9th PSYOP Battalion, 20 March, 2004.
[73] FM 3-05.30 pp. 6-09 to 6-17.

combat operations with traditional leaflet, loudspeaker, and face-to-face engagements. Nevertheless, in the absence of additional PSYOP forces and means from the POB, this task fell to the TPTs to complete with the arrival of the first video product produced for the Afghan TA.

The 4th POG produced a video entitled "Why the U.S. is in Afghanistan" which explained in the primary Afghan languages of Dari and Pashtun, the 9-11 attacks and America's response.[75]  At first, the 82[d] Airborne Division TPTs showed the video, prepared on DVDs and VCDs, on laptop computers placed on the hood of High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)  to small audiences of 2-4 persons during tactical operations in villages in the American sector.  It was quickly obvious that the small screen limited both the size of the audience that could see the video as well as the visual impact the video would have on its viewers.  This method was wholly inadequate to effectively reach the TA.  Brigadier General Thomas P. Maney, of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, in a *New York Times* interview reported candidly that "the American military found it hard to get its [PSYOP] radio and television messages out to many villages that had access to neither."[76]

In October 2002, the 82[d] Airborne Division drafted a Request for Forces (RFF) message to request the deployment of the AN/MSQ-85B system to provide a capability to show PSYOP videos during operations.  The concept was to employ the AN/MSQ-85Bs of the POBs in a "traveling road show" mode, going from village to village as operations permitted.  This approach would have nested well with the "Team Village" approach,

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[74] Field Manual 33-1, p. 4-13.
[75] Mike Eckel, "U.S. Military Turns to Video of 9/11/01 to Win Hearts and Minds of Afghans," viewable at http://www.psywarrior.com/afghanvideo.html

whereby forces were concentrated into combined packages to address all aspects of civil-military operations with villages in the unit's area of operations. The RFF was not sent because coordination with the PSYOP community revealed that the system was both manpower-intensive and woefully obsolete, although it is still maintained in units. While the AN/MSQ-85B could have been used to disseminate PSYOP video products, doing so would have required the deployment of additional PSYOP forces, which was a difficult proposition as forces were being marshaled for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and because of imposed force cap constraints for OEF.

What the 82[d] Airborne Division needed was a lightweight system that the TPTs could take out in a HMMWV to set up a viewing area in direct sunlight for audiences of 10-40 people to show video products. The system had to be small enough to put in the back of the HMMWV along with the team's equipment and amplifier for the loudspeaker system, and rugged enough to survive the harsh desert environment.

Employment of the doctrinal imperative of "adaptability," namely that PSYOP forces "must adapt to methods and structures and help develop new ones suited for each mission,"[77] was key to overcoming the limitations imposed by having inadequate equipment for the task. Applying this imperative, the 82[d] Airborne Division purchased needed equipment through commercial sources to create a video dissemination system in order to reach the TA with PSYOP video. A gas-powered electric generator and television set comprised the makeshift system. The Division G4 (Logistics) purchased equipment for four systems, which were distributed to the TPTs.

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[76] Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Firing Leaflets and Electrons, U.S. Wages Information War," *New York Times*, February 24, 2003, p. 1.
[77] Field Manual 33-1, p. 3-25.

**Figure 2: TPT 921 Showing PSYOP Video in Tadokhiel Afghanistan. Source Mike Eckel, "U.S. Military Turns to Video of 9/11/01 to Win Hearts and Minds of Afghans," Associated Press.  See  http://www.psywarrior.com/afghanvideo.html**

Initial operations with the makeshift system were a significant improvement over the laptop computer method and permitted larger audiences of up to 10 people, however the TPTs encountered the same problem experienced with the laptop screen in daylight, namely that the image is difficult to see in bright sun. TPT 921 employed locally-hired Afghans to make a simple plywood cabinet for the system, to shade the screen from the sun during daylight operations, improving effectiveness, but the audience size was still less than what a system like the AN/MSQ-85B would have provided.  Additionally, the commercially procured televisions were not sufficiently rugged to withstand operations in the harsh desert environment.

In November 2002, after employing its ad-hoc commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology systems, the 82<sup>d</sup> Airborne Division sent its requirement for a compact,

rugged, tactical video point-dissemination system that could show video products, in bright sunlight, to audiences of 10-40 people, to the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army Rapid Equipping Force operating out of Aberdeen Proving Grounds.  The Rapid Equipping Force employed Army engineers to fabricate required systems and equipment for forces engaged in combat operations. The Rapid Equipping Force provided two prototype systems in December 2002 with TPT 921 and TPD 920 to test on MEDCAPS and tactical patrols.  The prototype system was assembled from commercial components and delivered to the Division headquarters at Bagram Air Base less than two months after the requirement was identified.

### Tactical Video PSYOP Dissemination in OEF

The 82[d] Airborne Division brought the PSYOP video, "Why the United States is in Afghanistan," directly to the people, most of whom had never seen a television, by deploying the TPT with a medical and Civil Affairs (CA) assessments of villages in the American sector.  The Division Commander, LTG John R. Vines (then MG), aggressively supported distribution of the PSYOP video and pushed for its inclusion with every mission that brought coalition soldiers into contact with the civilian populace.[78]

In an environment like Afghanistan, where combat operations occur alongside humanitarian ones, CA and PSYOP teams work closely together as they pursue different objectives oriented on the same TAs.[79]  Army doctrine explains the role of PSYOP support to HA: "the intended target audience may require medical assistance – medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) or dental civic action programs (DENTCAPs) – or

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[78] Mike Eckel, "U.S. Military Turns to Video of 9/11/01 to Win Hearts and Minds of Afghans," Associated Press.  Viewable at  http://www.psywarrior.com/afghanvideo.html
[79] See for example, C.H. Briscoe, op. cit., pp. 36-38.

some form of education...PSYOP and CA are mutually supporting."[80] If TPTs had

adequate video dissemination means, they could better support the HA mission, while

simultaneously accomplishing PSYOP objectives.

Force protection considerations in OEF mandated that the TPTs show the video

products during daylight hours, when security for the TPT and the civilian viewers could

be ensured. By accompanying MEDCAPS into villages in sector, the TPTs adhered to

force protection constraints and benefited from the security force established and

positioned for the MEDCAP. The PSYOP/CA lash-up in OEF repeated a pattern

established in previous operations, such as Operation JOINT GUARD in Bosnia, where

the force protection requirements (e.g. the four-vehicle convoy rule) reinforced the need

for Civil Affairs Tactical Support Teams and Tactical PSYOP Teams to combine their

operations.[81]

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[80] Field Manual 33-1-1, p. 11-5

[81] MAJ William Martin Yates, NZ Army, Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "What Effect Did General Order Number 1 And The Force Protection Measures Have on Task Force Eagle Operations In Bosnia During Implementation Force?" Fort Leavenworth KS, June 2003, p. 24.

## Chapter 6

### Improving Tactical Video PSYOP Dissemination

Two major approaches are obvious for improving tactical video PSYOP

dissemination, namely: 1) acquiring modern, rugged, and field-ready dissemination

equipment to provide the technical means, both for the POBs focused at the

tactical/operational level, and for the tactically-focused TPTs, and; 2)  acquiring

supporting programming to attract the TA to the PSYOP message.  The first of these

approaches is entirely within the ability of USSOCOM and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs

and Psychological Operations Command to integrate into on-going modernization efforts.

The second will require an inter-agency approach and new thinking about how to view

the placement of PSYOP video along with supporting non-PSYOP video material

acquired from sources outside the PSYOP community.

### Current PSYOP Modernization Efforts

A next-generation replacement for the AN/MSQ-85B is urgently required to

assume the tactical video point dissemination role.  USSOCOM's fiscal year 2004/2005

biennial budgets for Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation did not include any

funds for such a system, nor did it identify a requirement for such a capability.[82]  The

budget estimates contained no references to means to improve tactical PSYOP video

dissemination capabilities in media-austere environments.  However, a successor system,

generically referred to as the Mobile Audio Visual Dissemination System, is in the

concept design and requirements phase of development.[83]  Tactical dissemination means

for the TPTs must also be developed in addition to a successor to the AN/MSQ-85B.

In an effort to modernize PSYOP force capabilities, USSOCOM launched an

Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to examine various delivery

systems that would enable dissemination into "denied areas."[84]  Current projects are

focused on long-range dissemination into denied hostile areas and include a PSYOP

extended-range broadcast system, language-translation technologies and a wind-

supported aerial-delivery system.[85]  Desired capabilities sought by USSOCOM include

long-range, multi-dimensional broadcast system; a long-range, three-dimensional

holograph imaging system, and long-range, laser-light, text-messaging projection.[86]

Current efforts to expand US PSYOP capabilities to reach denied areas clearly

emphasize overcoming limitations imposed by geographic distance, enemy threats (such

as air-defense means), and enemy actions on the ground that isolate the TA.  For PSYOP,

following combat operations (consolidation PSYOP), and for PSYOP in support of

humanitarian assistance or peace operations, several factors routinely combine to deny an

audience to PSYOP video products.  Experience in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan show

that the low literacy rates, lack of access to televisions, and the absence of an

infrastructure that supports a television network, such as electric power combine to create

"denied audiences."

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[82] United States Special Operations Command, "Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY2005 Biennial Budget Estimates – RDT&E, Defense-Wide," February 2003.

[83] E-mail correspondence with LTC Carl Phillips, Commander, 9th PSYOP Battalion, March 20, 2004.

[84] Testimony of LTG Byran D. Brown, USA, at the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, for appointment as Commander, United States Special Operations Command and appointment to the grade of General, viewable at http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/news/brown-07-29-03.htm

[85] Harold Kennedy, "Special Operators Seeking A Technological Advantage," *National Defense*, May 2003, p. 20.

**Supporting PSYOP Video with Supplementary Programming**

To be successful, tactical dissemination means must emulate the mature media environment by providing an entertainment base upon which PSYOP messages may be added. News is an effective format that provides a service to the TA while providing the draw that makes the PSYOP message more appealing as part of an overall package.[87] The 4th POG has limited abilities to develop and produce video products, such as the "Why the U.S. is in Afghanistan" video. In order to get enough material to carry the PSYOP videos, the PSYOP community must seek external sources of appropriate video programming.

In his article in *Military Review*, CDR Randall Bowdish, observed that "military media capability is no match for the civilian sector" and recommended employing content from the commercial sector and products from government agencies in support of PSYOP messages.[88] The DSB Task Force came to the same conclusion and specifically recommended "a liberal reliance on recognized professionals and generous use of highly qualified commercial entities; *buying good content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure.*"[89] The DSB Task Force found that in addition to commercial products, several U.S. Government agencies might have unique and appropriate video, such as health and safety products, that could be dubbed with voice-over translation in support PSYOP programming. In a May 2002 report on Afghanistan prepared for the Department of Defense, the Rendon Group recommended that "US television programming should be made immediately available to Afghan government

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[86] Responses of LTG Bryan D. Brown, U.S. Army, at the Senate Armed Services Committee, o.p. cit.
[87] Field Manual 33-1, p. 3-6.
[88] Bowdish, p. 34.

TV…material could include sports, documentaries, and even culturally appropriate Hollywood films."[90]

Ideally, such programming should reinforce the general IO themes. Army tactical visual information doctrine from 1993 suggests appropriate content for supporting footage as "documentation that depicts scenes of reconstruction and rehabilitation with respect to installations, housing, and people-connected facilities in war-devastated areas under friendly control."[91] U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine suggests that tactical PSYOP forces may support news dissemination that keeps the people informed in order to support an overall political indoctrination or re-orientation program, typical to post-combat operations and PSO.[92] Execution of this TTP by deployed PSYOP forces requires supporting video programming and material.

Lessons learned in Bosnia pointed to the need for adaptable solutions incorporating COTS technology to acquire video material in support of PSYOP.[93] In Operation JOINT GUARD, PSYOP soldiers employed commercially procured digital video recorders and personal computers to produce viable PSYOP video products in the field.[94] Currently, the Broadcast PSYOP Company (POC) of the POB has the capability to deploy video teams with mobile equipment capable of producing high-quality video.[95] While PSYOP forces can certainly acquire needed imagery on their own, they can also request support from attached or assigned service or joint combat camera (COMCAM)

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[89] DSB Task Force report, op. cit., p. 27. emphasis mine.
[90] Whitney Azoy and Don North, p. 29.
[91] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 24-40, Chapter 5, p. 5. This manual *Tactical Visual Information Doctrine*, 12 December 1991, was superseded by FM 6-02.40, Visual Information Operations, 24 Jan. 2002. Current doctrine is less specific, and does not suggest material content.
[92] Field Manual 33-1, p. 3-6
[93] MAJ Steve Larsen, p. 59.
[94] MAJ Steve Larsen, p. 59.

units. Army and Joint doctrine assign COMCAM units the mission of supporting PSYOP with still and video imagery.[96] Support to PSYOP is not the primary mission for COMCAM elements; they are nevertheless an excellent source of video imagery of current operations and civil and societal conditions in the area of operations.

COMCAM elements routinely accompany military operations to document them in support of the commander's battlefield visualization and operations documentation requirements. In addition to the combat documentation and battlefield visualization missions, COMCAM can provide powerful images of U.S. forces that can be incorporated into supporting PA and PSYOP video products, especially in military operations other than war. Beyond organic PSYOP and support from COMCAM capabilities, the Navy's Fleet Audio-Visual Command, Pacific; the Fleet Imagery Command, Atlantic, and the Naval Imaging Command, are sources of supporting audio-visual products for PSYOP.[97] All of these methods of obtaining video material, however, are insufficient to build a supporting base of video programming on which PSYOP programming can ride. Building and sustaining such a base will require co-opting commercial video programming.

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[95] Field Manual 3-05.301, pp. 6-17 and 9-18.

[96] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 6.02.40 (FM24-40),*Visual Information Operations*, Washington D.C., 24 January 2002, pp 2-2 and 3-11. See also Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA), *COMCAM Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations*, (FM 3-55.12, MCRP 3-33.7A, NWP3-13.12, AFTTP(I) 3-2.41), Langley AFB, VA, March 2003, p. I-1.

[97] Field Manual 3-05.301, p. 9-20.

**Building a Television/Video Base Appropriate to the Target Audience**

When the 82[d] Airborne Division deployed to Afghanistan in 2002, the official Afghan TV was broadcasting only five hours a day with an erratic program schedule and could not reach beyond the limits of Kabul.[98] Because of civil wars leading to the Taliban rise to power and the ban on all TV during the Taliban regime, there is a dearth of video programming available for the Afghan viewing audience. The need for additional material as a draw for the PSYOP message was especially critical in Afghanistan, as there was only one PSYOP video product, making the TPT a "one-trick pony." Commercially produced programming that is culturally appropriate can draw the TA to the medium and serve as the lure for US PSYOP-produced video products.

In December 2002, the 82[d] Airborne Division sought to procure through State Department contacts, supporting video programming produced by *Ariana Television*, an Afghan-American television broadcasting studio in Northern Virginia, for use in the limited television markets in Afghanistan through US PSYOP channels. The intent was to make these videos available to tactical PSYOP forces to create a draw for crowds to see the 4th POG video. Organizational barriers between the State Department, which has subsumed the former U.S. Information Service and USSOCOM, which controls US PSYOP forces, must be breached in order to facilitate the use of commercially produced ethnically, culturally, and linguistically-appropriate video products in support of PSYOP.

In pursuit of appropriate video material to support video PSYOP, another option may be able to tap into international efforts to address the media austerity of the target

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[98] Whitney Azoy and Don North, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

nation.  UNESCO started a drive for nations to donate programming in order to provide

some video programming for the revived Afghan TV stations.  According to Rosa

Gonzalez of the UNESCO Communications Development Division, the "Screens without

frontiers" video drive provided over 300 programs for which programming rights have

been waived.[99]  In addition to the donated programming, UNESCO purchased the rights

to 102 television programs from countries around the globe and made them available to

Afghan Radio-Television at no charge for a two-year period under a program known as

*CreaTV* television initiative.[100]

Effective video PSYOP, especially broadcast video PSYOP, require

supplementary programming beyond just military sources.  The requirements to sustain a

daily video program are demanding: "each day's operation requires a large amount of

film, videotape, and live programming to sustain a program schedule."[101]  Reaching out

to U.S. Government, private industry, and international sources can ensure that PSYOP

forces challenged to conduct video PSYOP have enough material from which to

assemble a quality video program.

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[99] "UNESCO Launches Collection of Quality Programming for Radio-Television Afghanistan," January 20, 2002, viewable at
http://portal.unesco.org/fr/ev.php@URL_ID=1737&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
[100] "Afghanistan Television Receives International Programmes Package," May 10, 2002, viewable at
http://www.unesco.org/webworld/news/2002/020510_creativ.shtml
[101] Field Manual 3-05.301, p. 10-18.

## Chapter 7

## Conclusion and Recommendations

At the close of the 20th Century, the Institute for National and Strategic Studies recognized that the most likely operations to involve PSYOP forces would be conducted in what the report termed a "low-tech environment," one in which the extant media will be limited.[102]   Current post-combat operations in Afghanistan support this contention. U.S. Southern Command's recent deployment of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to to Haiti on March 1, 2004 in Operation SECURE TOMORROW demonstrates that U.S. PSYOP forces continue to face the challenge of operating in media-austere environments. The mission of the CJTF is to ensure stability and return order as part of a multinational interim force.[103]   Like Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, this new operation is employing PSYOP forces to gain the cooperation of the Haitian people to resolve the current crisis and reduce the causes of instability.  As with Afghanistan, Haiti's low literacy rate makes video imagery a powerful vehicle and therefore an effective option for PSYOP messages.  Renewed operations in Haiti and continuing operations in Afghanistan demonstrate that the requirement for a tactical video dissemination system for media-austere operating environments is both immediate and enduring.

USSOCOM, through the DoD, must work with DoS and other agencies to acquire access to supporting video programming, based on likely areas of operation where U.S.

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[102] National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies *1998 Strategic Assessment, Engaging Power for Peace,* Chapter Ten, p. 163, viewable at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa98/sa98cont.html

forces could be employed in combat or MOOTW.  The procedures and contacts must be

made during peacetime to permit rapid execution in time of crisis.  All video products of

the U.S. government should be available for use in support of PSYOP, after appropriately

modified to make them linguistically, ethnically, and culturally appropriate to the TA.

Likewise, the DoS should work with international sources to obtain access to third-

country video programming that could support U.S. PSYOP by sustaining the interest of

the TA during both broadcast and point dissemination video PSYOP.  U.S. PSYOP

forces must be able to rapidly respond to the changing mission with new PSYOP video

products that complement radio and print products, and sustain the audience with

supporting programming from governmental or international sources.

Joint PSYOP doctrine states, "the dissemination plan must take into account the

type of PSYOP product…and the means to deliver [it]."[104]   Unfortunately, while the

TPTs in OEF had a video product, they lacked the means to disseminate it.  The absence

of delivery means violated the doctrinal media-selection assessment criteria of

Availability.  "Availability" of a medium is determined by asking this question "Is the

medium available to the PSYOP unit?" According to recent doctrine, this assessment

criterion covers the availability of personnel "*as well as equipment."[105]*  USSOCOM

must acquire the necessary tactical dissemination means to make video products an

option available to deployed PSYOP forces operating in media-austere conditions.

USSOCOM must equip its POBs to accomplish their doctrinally assigned role in

tactical video dissemination.  A successor to the AN/MSQ-85B should receive

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[103].  See Jim Garamone American Forces Press Service, "Hait Interim Force Rises to 3,300," *Hawaii Army Weekly,* Vol. 33, No. 12, March 25, 2004, p. 1.

[104] Joint Pub 3-53, *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations,* July 1996, pp. IV-3 to IV-4.

accelerated development and procurement priority. Any delay in the design, development, and fielding of a successor to the MSQ-85B may lead to "mission failure" for U.S. PSYOP to accomplish its doctrinally assigned mission for tactical video dissemination.[106]

In addition, USSOCOM's ACTD should include the prototype system the Rapid Equipping Force delivered to the 82d Airborne in Afghanistan. Recent operations have shown the need for a tactical video PSYOP dissemination system that could accompany the TPTs, that is rugged enough to survive operations in harsh environments, and compact enough to be carried along with the TPT's basic combat load in an already cramped HMMWV. If U.S. PSYOP is once again called to operate in a media-austere environment where operational-level broadcast systems will fail to reach a large segment of the TA, then tactical dissemination means will be required.

In Afghanistan, U.S. forces attempted to bridge the gap between the potential impact of video PSYOP with its mass appeal and powerful imagery with ad-hoc and make-shift solutions, but a permanent solution is required to provide tactical PSYOP forces the necessary means to disseminate it in a media-austere environment. Without adequate tactical dissemination means for the dissemination POBs and TPTs, U.S. video PSYOP cannot reach denied audiences in media-austere operating environments. Without supporting programming that is ethnically, linguistically, and culturally appropriate in content, U.S. PSYOP forces won't be able to attract and sustain TA

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[105] Field Manual 33-1-1, emphasis mine.
[106] United States Army Special Operations Command, "Initial Capabilities Document for Mobile Audio-Visual System," DRAFT, 18 July 2003.

interest, regardless of whatever ad-hoc dissemination means they are forced to develop

by necessity in the absence of mission-designed issued systems.

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